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Introduction
Title IV of the Financial Services Modernization Act
of 1999 closed an important loophole in U.S. bank-
ing law: the unitary thrift holding company exemp-
tion from laws that prevented the mingling of bank-
ing and commerce.1The loophole had allowed
nondepository institutions, including nonfinancial
corporations, to own unitary thrift holding compa-
nies (UTHCs). Only depository institutions could
own multiple bank and thrift holding companies or
unitary bank holding companies. The period over
which the exemption was in force provides us with
the opportunity to examine the implications of com-
mingling banking and commerce. 
The focus of this paper is a comparison of the
performance of thrifts in UTHCs with that of other
thrifts. Because little stock market data on UTHCs
is available, this study constructs performance mea-
sures using balance sheet and income statement data
from Thrift Financial Reports.2
Overall, we find important differences between
UTHC subsidiaries and other thrifts. UTHC thrifts
tend to outperform other thrifts during the sample
period studied. Moreover, UTHC thrifts appear to
have more diversified revenues streams, loan and
asset portfolios, and funding sources than do non-
UTHC thrifts. Furthermore, differences do not 
suggest UTHC thrifts pose a greater risk to the fed-
eral financial safety net; UTHC thrifts produce sim-
ilar returns on book equity as non-UTHC thrifts
but with higher levels of capitalization.  Therefore,
we find no evidence consistent with a need to close
the UTHC loophole, which could reduce the con-
testability of banking markets. Overall, these results
suggest that some limited commingling of banking
and commerce might not pose undue risks to the
federal financial safety net. But because thrifts have
limited commercial lending powers, these results
must be interpreted cautiously when evaluating less
restrictive environments.
I.  History of the Unitary Thrift Loophole
Holding companies grew in importance in the
1940s and early 1950s as banks used this organiza-
tional form to circumvent regulatory restrictions on
branching and other activities. Most thrifts could
not adopt the holding company form. Subsidiary
depository institutions of the holding company had
to be stock chartered, but most savings institu-
tions—and all federally chartered thrifts—were
■ 1 Public Law No. 106-102.
■ 2 Most UTHCs are wholly owned subsidiaries of larger organiza-
tions, so stock market data do not exist for these firms.
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stock-chartered used the holding company form.
Concerned about the growth of multibank hold-
ing companies, Congress passed the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 to regulate them and
extended the regulation to unitary bank holding
companies in 1970. The regulations restricted the
ownership of holding companies, their interstate
expansion, and the activities permitted to nonbank
subsidiaries. The Reigle-Neal Act of 1994 and the
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999
reduced or eliminated these restrictions, except the
restrictions on ownership.
Congressional attempts to reign in the growth of
thrift holding companies began with the Spence Act
of 1959. This act placed a moratorium on the for-
mation of multiple thrift holding companies and the
acquisition of additional thrifts by existing holding
companies. The act did not extend to multithrift
holding companies that already existed, and it did
not prohibit the formation of UTHCs or regulate
their behavior. The 1967 Savings and Loan Holding
Company Amendments removed the moratorium
and subjected multithrift holding companies to reg-
ulation. Despite the objection of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, the federal regulator of thrifts
and thrift holding companies, Congress exempted
UTHCs from regulation.3
Three factors likely played into the decision to
exempt UTHCs from regulation. First, at the time
thrift holding company regulations were enacted,
unitary bank holding companies were also exempt
from holding company regulation. Second, thrifts
had very restricted lending powers, and allowing
nondepository firms to own unitary thrift holding
companies would not give rise to the concerns about
conflict of interest and concentration of power that
the commingling of commercial banking and com-
merce would.4 Finally, rising interest rates in the
second half of the 1960s threatened the solvency of
a number of thrift institutions. Instead of acting to
resolve the statutorily induced duration mismatch
between thrift assets and liabilities, policymakers
took a series of actions aimed at providing thrifts
with access to inexpensive deposits—including
extending Regulation Q ceilings to savings deposits
in thrifts.  In other words, policymakers limited the
ability of small savers to earn positive real rates of
return on their savings in order to assure the fund-
ing of the housing finance industry.5 In this envi-
ronment, it is not surprising that policymakers
would continue to allow nondepository financial
firms and nonfinancial firms (henceforth, non-
banks) to own UTHCs. The UTHC exemption
would be viewed as a method of providing 
3
additional sources of equity capital for the thrift
industry as it provided a limited form of entry into
banking by nondepository institutions.  
II.  Empirical Strategy and Sample
This paper investigates whether thrifts in UTHCs
perform differently than other types of thrifts, and if
so, why. It is possible that the UTHC form is a
more efficient arrangement because it gives the firm
greater flexibility in arranging links between com-
mercial and banking activities. On the other hand,
the links could give the thrifts an advantage only at
the expense of taxpayers, by extending the federal
financial safety net subsidy to the nondepository
owners.6
We compare the earnings, leverage, and portfolio
risk of UTHC thrifts and non-UTHC thrifts.7
We also compare the performance of thrifts owned
by depository and nondepository institutions. 
Ideally, we would directly test for differences in 
risk-adjusted return on equity and the likelihood of
failure. However, using balance sheet and income
data from Thrift Financial Reports precludes us
from constructing direct measures of risk variables,
and the sample period does not contain sufficient
numbers of thrift closings to fit a hazard function to
the data. Hence, our tests measure dimensions of
risk and return using proxy variables that are drawn
(in large part) from the bank performance and bank
failure and early warning literature.8The list of vari-
ables used and their definitions appears in table 1.
The sample consists of all SAIF-insured thrift
institutions that filed at least one complete OTS
Thrift Financial Report between March 31, 1993,
and December 31, 1999, and also were not in con-
servatorship. The sample period begins after the
Thrift Financial Report was substantially revised as 
a result of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion Improvement Act of 1991 and ends before 
the UTHC exemption was closed by the Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999. Thrifts are
divided into three groups, those in UTHCs, those in
■ 3 See Office of Thrift Supervision (1998a, 1997).
■ 4 See Office of Thrift Supervision (1998a) and Boyd, Chang, and
Smith (1998).
■ 5 See Kane (1970, 1977, and 1985, chapter 4).
■ 6 The empirical strategy is similar to that used by Valnek (1999) to
compare the performance of stock retail banks and mutual building soci-
eties in the United Kingdom.
■ 7 For a discussion of alternative ways to gauge performance using
accounting data, see Sinkey (1998, chapter 3).
■ 8 See Cole (1972), Gillis et al. (1980), and Thomson (1991, 1992).
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Economic Review 2001 Q2CAPA Equity capital/total assets
LAGCAPA  CAPA lagged one quarter 
CLASSASM  Classified assets/earning assets
FEESHR  Fee income/operating income
FIXEDA  Fixed assets/total assets
FHLBADVA  Federal Home Loan Bank advances/
total assets
INSDEPA  Insured deposits/total assets
INSLNA  Loans to insiders/total assets 
INTSHR  Interest income/total income
LGAP  Total cash, deposits due from depository 
(Liquidity gap) institutions, and investment securities
minus borrowings/total assets 
LIABHERF 10000• [(deposits/total liabilities)2
(Liability +  (borrowings/total  liabilities)2
Herfindahl  + (other liabilities/total liabilities)2]
index) 
LNHERF 10000 •
(Loan [(credit card receivables/total loans)2
Herfindahl + (other consumer loans/total loans)2
index) + (home equity loans/total loans)2
+ (commercial loans/total loans)2
+ (1–4 family mortgage loans/
total loans)2
+ (other mortgage loans/total loans)2
+ (all other loans/total loans)2]
MPSA Mortgage pool securities/total assets 
MDERA  Mortgage derivative securities/total assets
NIM Interest income minus interest expense/
earning assets
4
■  9 The thrift holding company database can be found on the Office of
Thrift Supervision Web site, <www.ots.treas.gov/applications.html>.
Variable Definitions
T   A   B   L   E  1
NTCHRGOF Net charge-offs/earning assets
OVRHD  Operating expense/total assets 
QTLM ortgage-related assets/total assets
REGLIQR  Liquid assets meeting criteria set 
(Regulatory forth by the Office of Thrift
liquidity) Supervision/total liabilities
ROAN et income after taxes and 
extraordinary items/total assets 
ROEN et income after taxes and 
extraordinary items/common equity 
SBLA Total small business loans/total assets
SIZE Natural log of total assets 
SUBDEBTA Subordinated debt/total assets
TIER1CAP Tier 1 capital/total assets
TRUSTA Trust assets/total assets
Intercept and Slope Dummy Variables
DUMUT 1 if thrift is in a UTHC, 
0 otherwise
DUMUD 1 if thrift is in a UTHC owned 
by a depository institution, 
0 otherwise
DUMUN 1 if thrift is in a UTHC owned
by a nondepository institution,
0 otherwise
XXXXUT XXXX  • DUMUT
XXXXUD XXXX  • DUMUD
XXXXUN XXXX  • DUMUN
multithrift holding companies, and independent
thrifts. Thrifts in the UTHC sample were further
partitioned into two groups according to affiliation,
using the Office of Thrift Supervision’s holding com-
pany file. The first consists of UTHCs owned or
controlled by depository institutions (henceforth,
banks), and the second consists of thrifts in UTHCs
that are affiliated with nonbanks.9
III.  Results
Differences in Return on Equity
The simplest method for evaluating performance is
to examine differences in return on equity (ROE)
across the different types of thrifts in the sample. 
As seen in table 2, the ROE of thrifts owned by
UTHCs does not differ significantly from that of
other thrifts during the full sample period. But
when assessing whether the UTHC loophole repre-
sented a dangerous mixing of banking and com-
merce, differences across UTHCs by ownership
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Economic Review 2001 Q2Non-UTHC UTHC Nonbank Bank
Thrifts Thrifts UTHCs UTHCs
Mean 0.0181 0.0200 0.0251 0.0195
Std. error 0.0013 0.0016 0.0020 0.0017
P-value 0.3566 0.0375
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type are probably more relevant. After all, ownership
of a UTHC expands the set of activities a nondepos-
itory institution can engage in, while UTHC own-
ership by banks and thrifts represents a more modest
expansion of their existing franchise. Thrifts in non-
bank-UTHCs outperformed thrifts in bank-
UTHCs during the sample period, and the differ-
ence is significant.
Unfortunately, simple comparisons of ROE can 
be misleading. Given the positive relationship
between risk and required return, a higher ROE may
simply reflect higher risk. Even after controlling for
risk, comparing the ROE of the different subsamples
does not provide sufficient information to understand
the underlying factors driving the performance of
earnings measures such as ROE. For example, the
higher ROE for UTHCs owned by nondepository
firms may reflect a conflict of interest arising from the
commingling of banking and commerce (albeit on a
limited basis), a superior set of real options held by
the nondepository UTHCs, or simply a higher degree
of leverage employed by these firms. 
Differences in Return on Assets and 
the Ratio of Capital to Assets
The first step in sorting out the different possible
influences on ROE is to decompose it into its main
components: return on assets (ROA) and the
amount of capital per dollar of assets (CAPA).
(1) ROE = 
The optimum degree of risk borne by a firm is a
function of the risks emanating from its asset port-
folio and the degree of leverage employed. Equation
(1) illustrates how ROE is driven by these two
simultaneous sets of decisions by the thrift’s man-
agement, with the investment/operating decision
represented by ROA and the financing decision
embodied on CAPA. 
Overall, the first stage of ROE decomposition
reported in table 3 suggests that thrifts in UTHCs,
particularly those in UTHCs owned by nonbanks,
perform better because they have higher ROA, not
higher leverage. While we can’t reject the hypothesis
that higher risk produced the higher ROE, these
univariate results are not consistent with increased
leverage driving the results. The first column of
table 3 shows that the difference in ROA between
UTHC thrifts and non-UTHC thrifts is not statisti-
cally significant. UTHC thrifts have higher capital-
to-asset ratios than non-UTHC thrifts, and the dif-
ference is significant during the sample period.
Insignificant differences in ROE and the signifi-
cantly higher level of CAPA for the UTHC thrifts
relative to other thrifts suggest that performance-
related differences between UTHC thrifts and non-
UTHC thrifts are due to differences in ROA. That
is, differences in performance across these two sam-
ples are driven by differences in operating/invest-
ment decisions and not by leverage. A comparison
of tables 2 and 3 shows that in all three samples,
higher ROE is accompanied by lower leverage
(higher CAPA). 
Similar results hold for the two UTHC subsamples.
Thrifts in nonbank UTHCs have higher ROA,
although the difference is not statistically significant,
and they have significantly higher CAPA. Taken
together, these findings suggest that important differ-




SOURCES:  Office of Thrift Supervision, Thrift Financial Reports; and author’s calculations.
Components of ROE
SOURCES:  Office of Thrift Supervision, Thrift Financial Reports; and author’s calculations.
ROA
CAPA
T   A   B   L   E  2
T   A   B   L   E  3
Non-UTHC UTHC Nonbank Bank
Thrifts Thrifts UTHCs UTHCs
Mean 0.0018 0.0019 0.0028 0.0018
Std. error 0.0000 0.0001 0.0008 0.0001
P-value 0.3680 0.2561
Non-UTHC UTHC Nonbank Bank
Thrifts Thrifts UTHCs UTHCs
Mean 0.1037 1.1110 0.1621 0.1061
Std. error 0.0004 0.0010 0.0079 0.0007
P-value <0.0001 <0.0001
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subsamples, and these differences are related to operat-
ing and investment decisions. Decomposing ROE fur-
ther should tell us more about how ROA affects ROE. 
Differences in the Factors 
That Affect Return on Assets
The second stage of the ROE decomposition exam-
ines the underlying controllable factors that drive
ROA—business mix, income production, asset 
quality, expense control, and tax management—by
specifying and estimating the following equation:
(2) ROAit=    0 +    1NIMit +    2NTCHRGOFit
+    3OVRHDit +    4SIZEit
+    5LAGCAPAit +   6FEESHRit 
+    7LGAPit +   8QTLit +   9INSDEPAit
+    10DUMUTit +   11NIMUTit
+    12NTCHRGOFUTit
+    13OVRHDUTit +   14SIZEUTit
+    15LAGCAPAUTit +   16FEESHRUTit
+    17LGAPUTit +   18QTLUTit
+    19INSDEPAUTit +    it
Table 1 explains how these variables were con-
structed. To proxy for business mix, we included 
variables for the proportion of a thrift’s assets that are
mortgage related (QTL), the proportion of its funding
that comes from insured deposits (INSDEPA), the
proportion of its income that comes from fee-based
services (FEESHR), and the size of its liquidity gap
(LGAP). Asset quality is captured by the proportion 
of net charge-offs to interest-earning assets
(NTCHRGOF), although this variable may also 
be related to tax management or expense preference
behavior—where the reporting of losses is delayed
until profits are higher than average to reduce taxes
(see Greenwalt and Sinkey [1988]). Income produc-
tion is proxied for primarily by the spread between
interest income and interest expense scaled by average
assets (NIM), although income from fee-based 
services (FEESHR) may also be related. The ratio of 
operating expenses to assets (OVRHD) is included to
capture expense control. We included a measure of the
relative size of the thrift’s overall balance sheet (SIZE)
because economies of scale may play a role in provid-
ing a number of financial products and services. The
previous quarter’s capital-to-asset ratio (LAGCAPA) 
is included because the investment/operating 
decision and the financing decision of depository
institutions are not independent. To test the hypothe-
sis that earnings-related measures of performance don’t
differ across the groups of thrifts, we include intercept
and slope dummy variables for the thrift type. For
thrifts in the UTHC sample, the effect of each 
independent variable is measured by combining its
coefficient and the coefficient on the corresponding
dummy variable. 
Equation (2) is estimated using ordinary least
squares. The results are presented in table 4 and
appear to reject the hypothesis that no performance
differences exist, as the coefficients on all the
dummy variables except the proportion of mort-
gage-related assets (QTLUT) are significant at the 
1 percent level. A closer inspection of the results,
however, is needed to ascertain whether perfor-
mance-related differences stem from extensions of
the federal safety net or an increased set of options
available to UTHCs. To do this, we examined 
differences between UTHC and non-UTHC thrift
ROA as captured by the proxies for business mix,
asset quality, and the financing decision. 
The regression results show business mix is
important in determining the earnings performance
of thrifts; all of the variables that proxy for this fac-
tor are significant. Three of the four corresponding
dummy variables are significant and of opposite
sign, indicating that differences in business mix
between thrifts in UTHCs and other thrifts drive
differences in earnings performance. In fact, the
dummy variables for fee income and liquidity gap
are larger in absolute value, meaning these variables
affect ROA in opposite ways and to different degrees
depending on the type of thrift. 
Non-UTHC thrifts appear to have lower ROA if
they rely more heavily on fee income for revenues
(FEESHR is negative and significant). One should
be careful, however, in interpreting these results in
terms of performance. If fee income and interest
income are sufficiently uncorrelated, thrifts with
higher levels of fee income may have less variable
revenues and higher risk-adjusted returns. However,
the coefficient on FEESHRUT and the combined
effect of FEESHR for UTHC thrifts is significantly
positive. The different relationship between
FEESHR and earnings for UTHC thrifts may trace
to scale economies in the production of fee-based
lines of business—the mean of SIZE for UTHC
thrifts is significantly larger than for non-UTHC
thrifts during the sample period—or to economies
of scope and cross-selling opportunities with other
businesses conducted in the holding company or by
its parent firm. If we accept the argument that fee
income is not highly correlated with interest
income—that is, fee income reduces the variability
of revenues—then the fact that fee-based services
generate better performance for UTHC thrifts than
for other thrifts is not consistent with the hypothesis
that performance differences trace to increased risk
and safety-net subsidies. 
The positive and significant sign on LGAP 
suggests that non-UTHC thrifts benefit from the
flexibility option associated with liquidity (as mea-
sured by the difference between liquid assets and
short-term nondeposit liabilities), and they perform
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has the opposite effect on ROA; the coefficient on
LGAPUT and the net effect of LGAP on ROA for
UTHC thrifts is significantly negative. There are two
possible explanations for why this is so. On one hand,
the parent holding company may serve as a source of
strength and liquidity for its thrift subsidiary, so
UTHC thrifts do not need as much on-balance-sheet
liquidity to conduct their operations. That is, holding
companies may provide their thrift subsidiaries with
access to other funding sources which, at the margin,
may be less expensive than raising additional retail
deposits.10 In addition, UTHC thrifts are larger and
more likely to face deposit constraints than non-
UTHC thrifts. On the other hand, UTHC thrifts
may find it desirable to take on more liquidity risk to
increase the value of their federal deposit guarantees.
Obviously, the first explanation would be consistent
with the greater-options hypothesis, while the latter
would be consistent with the safety-net-subsidy
hypothesis. But differences in leverage and the 
composition of nondeposit funding between the two 
samples of thrifts do not support the safety-net-
subsidy hypothesis.  After all, UTHC thrifts are 
significantly less leveraged than non-UTHC thrifts,
and a large part of the funding difference arises
because UTHC thrifts rely more on Federal Home
Loan Bank advances.11
It is somewhat curious that for non-UTHC
thrifts, the proportion of assets funded by insured
deposits is significantly negatively related to ROA.
Moreover, while the dummy variable for this factor is
positive, it is smaller in absolute value than 
INSDEPA, and the relationship between INSDEPA
and ROA for percentage of funding remains negative
and significant for UTHC thrifts. Care needs to be
taken in interpreting these results since insured
deposits are a stable funding source and are likely 
to reduce profit variability. UTHC thrift earnings
appear to be less sensitive to changes in the insured
deposit base than other thrifts (the coefficient on
INSDEPAUT is positive). This may be due to 
funding advantages associated with holding 
company affiliation, which reduces the marginal cost
of funding additional assets. In other words, differ-
ences in earnings performance based on INSDEPA
are not likely to trace to increased safety-net subsidies
but to greater availability of deposit substitutes
(enhanced funding options) associated with using 
the holding company organizational form.
ROA is positively related to the concentration of
thrift assets in mortgage-related loans and securities
(QTL). This positive relationship may indicate thrifts
have specialized expertise in mortgage-related assets
and a competitive advantage in housing-finance 
markets. On the other hand, the Competitive 
Equality Banking Act established a qualified-thrift-
lender requirement that required a minimum level 
of investment in qualified assets (primarily housing-
finance-related assets and, after 1996, small business
and agricultural loans). Given the qualified-thrift-
lender requirement, the positive and significant 
coefficient on QTL may be proxying for regulatory
taxes—that is, thrifts with high QTL would be less
subject to regulatory interference. The coefficient on
QTLUT is not significant, however, and this sheds
some doubt on that interpretation. If a thrift in a
UTHC fails to meet the QTL test, the UTHC is 
subject to more stringent and invasive bank holding
company regulation. In the case of nonbank-UTHC
OLS Estimation of Equation 2
Dependent Variable: ROA
Coefficient t-Statistic Prob > t
Intercept –0.0014 –2.26 0.024
NIM 0.6308 83.58 <0.0001
NTCHRGOF 0.0895 13.00 <0.0001
OVRHD –1.0328 –126.68 <0.0001
SIZE 0.0001 2.90 0.0037
LAGCAPA 0.0127 23.69 <0.0001
FEESHR –0.0002 –1.95 0.0517
LGAP 0.0023 8.38 <0.0001
QTL0 .0013 3.62 0.0003
INSDEPA –0.0012 –8.40 <0.0001
DUMUT –0.0131 –9.59 <0.0001
NIMUT 0.4028 13.70 <0.0001
NTCHRGOFUT –0.2689 –31.15 <0.0001
OVRHDUT 1.0474 101.56 <0.0001
SIZEUT 0.0004 5.70 <0.0001
LAGCAPAUT –0.0177 –14.06 <0.0001
FEESHRUT 0.0026 4.68 <0.0001
LGAPUT –0.0050 –11.06 <0.0001
QTLUT0 .0007 1.06 0.2892






Prob > F <0.0001
Number of 
observations 25,614
■  10 Most of the difference in the liquidity gap between samples
derives from differences in funding, as liquid assets made up similar 
portions of both group’s assets—20 percent for non-UTHC thrifts and 
18 percent for UTHC thrifts.
■  11 Over the sample period, thrifts in the UTHC sample financed 
12 percent of their assets with Federal Home Loan Bank advances on aver-
age, while advances were 4 percent of non-UTHC thrifts’ assets.
SOURCES:  Office of Thrift Supervision, Thrift Financial Reports; and author’s calculations.
T   A   B   L   E  4
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thrifts, penalties for failing the qualified-thrift-
lender test could include forced divestiture of the
thrift subsidiary.
The positive and significant effect of the propor-
tion of a thrift’s net charge-offs to interest-earning
assets suggests that non-UTHC thrifts perform bet-
ter the more they engage in expense preference
behavior—the timing of loss recognition to smooth
income for tax purposes. Note that the opposite is
true for UTHC thrifts (the coefficient on the
dummy variable is negative and significant, and the
overall effect for UTHC thrifts is significantly nega-
tive), which is consistent with low net charge-offs as
an indicator of asset quality. The net charge-off vari-
able might operate differently across the subsamples
because holding companies are able to utilize lever-
age at the parent-company level to arbitrage taxes.
Thus, thrifts in holding companies have less of an
incentive to engage in expense preference behavior.
Unfortunately, because non-UTHC thrifts also
engage in this behavior, it is impossible to interpret
differences in the coefficients on NTCHRGOF
across the two groups of thrifts as an indicator of
differences in asset quality. 
The coefficient on LAGCAPA is significantly
positive—which is consistent with the findings in
table 3 that firms with high ROE also had high 
capital-to-asset ratios. The negative coefficient on
LAGCAPAUT indicates that UTHC-thrift earnings
are less sensitive to the level of capital than non-
UTHC thrifts. Two factors likely drive these results.
First, UTHC thrifts have higher levels of capital
than independent thrifts. Second, to the extent that
the parent holding company serves as a source of
strength to its thrift subsidiary, we would expect the
thrift-level financing decision to have less of an
impact on performance.
Three other differences emerge from the ROA
decomposition. First, UTHC-thrift earnings perfor-
mance is significantly more responsive to changes in
the net interest margin than non-UTHC thrifts. The
coefficient on the proxy for efficiency, OVRHD, has
a large negative effect on ROA. However, this earn-
ings factor has no effect on earnings performance for
UTHC thrifts (the coefficient on OVRHDUT is of
the same magnitude and of opposite sign as the 
coefficient on OVRHD). Finally, larger thrifts have
higher earnings, and this effect is significantly greater
for UTHC thrifts (the coefficients on SIZE and
SIZEUT are both positive and significant).
Differences between Bank- and 
Nonbank-UTHC Thrifts
Overall, the results of the ROA decomposition over
the full sample of thrifts are consistent with the
hypothesis that performance-related differences exist
between UTHC thrifts and non-UTHC thrifts.
However, the nature of the differences across these
two samples does not provide sufficient information
to decide which of the two possible causes is respon-
sible. Given that the UTHC exemption may be
more valuable, or at least the bundle of real options
associated with owning a UTHC thrift is likely dif-
ferent, for nonbank owners of UTHCs than for
depository institutions, we perform the ROA
decomposition again, but over the UTHC sample
only. We re-estimate equation (2), including inter-
cept and dummy variables for type of UTHC own-
ership to explore differences between thrifts owned
by nonbank UTHCs and those owned by bank
UTHCs. The results of this regression are presented
in table 5.
Business Mix
Because we are exploring differences based on 
ownership type, we focus on the coefficients of the
nonbank ownership dummy variables. We first 
consider whether different choices of business mix
are responsible for differences in performance. The
results of this regression suggest that nonbank
UTHC thrifts use a different business mix than
bank UTHC thrifts. Interest income appears to be 
a less important determinant of ROA for thrifts
owned by nonbank firms (NIMUN is negative and
significant, but of smaller magnitude than NIM).
Fee income seems more important (the coefficients
on FEESHRUN and SIZEUN are positive and sig-
nificant, and the overall relationship between the
share of fee income and ROA for nonbank-UTHC
thrifts is positive). These results are consistent with
nonbank UTHCs holding a different set of real
options than depository institutions. In other words,
as the logit regression analysis that follows will con-
firm, it is the options other than lending powers
afforded by depository institution charters—such as
access to the payments system—that have the most
value to the nonbank acquirers of UTHCs. 
Several other important differences emerge
between nonbank UTHCs and bank UTHCs. First,
asset quality matters more to earnings performance for
nonbank-UTHC thrifts than for bank-UTHC thrifts
(the signs on NTCHRGOF and 
NTCHRGOFUN are significantly negative). 
Second, the coefficients on OVRHD and
OVRHDUN are significant and of opposite sign. The
overall impact of efficiency for nonbank-UTHC
thrifts is positive and significant. In other words, the
lack of a significant efficiency effect on earnings per-
formance in the first estimation of equation (2) for
UTHC thrifts was due to conflicting effects within
the UTHC sample. Given that OVRHD is con-
structed as the ratio of operating expense to total
assets, the differences in the effect of this proxy on
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
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earnings across the nonbank- and bank-UTHC sam-
ples may reflect differences in business mix and strat-
egy. If nonbank-UTHC thrifts place greater emphasis
on fee-based products and services, higher levels of
OVRHD may be picking up increased activity in
these areas, and increases in operating expenses per
dollar of assets would be positively related to 
earnings performance. Hence, the significantly posi-
tive sign on OVRHDUN is consistent with the
hypothesis that nonbank UTHCs hold a different set
of real options than bank UTHCs and non-UTHC
thrifts.
Bank-UTHC thrifts exhibit a significantly nega-
tive relationship between ROA and the previous
quarter’s capital-to-assets ratio (LAGCAPA) and a
negative but not significant relationship between
ROA and the share of insured deposits (INSDEPA).
For nonbank-UTHC thrifts, ROA is significantly
negatively related to the share of insured deposits 
(the coefficient on INSDEPAUN is negative and 
significant). However, the net effect of the capital-to-
assets ratio on earnings is not significantly different
from zero for nonbank-UTHC thrifts (the coefficient
on LAGCAPAUN is positive and significant and of
the same magnitude as the coefficient on LAG-
CAPA). Finally, liquidity has opposite effects on ROA
in the two groups. It is negative for bank-UTHC
thrifts and positive for nonbank-UTHC thrifts (the
coefficients on LGAP and LGAPUN are significantly
negative and positive, respectively). The impact of
differences in the financing decision on performance
as proxied for by ROA for the bank-UTHC thrifts
and the nonbank-UTHC thrifts is not consistent
with the hypothesis that this commingling of banking
and commerce increases the loss exposure of the tax-
payer to the federal financial safety net. 
Finally, the fact that the concentration of mort-
gage-backed assets (QTL) is negative and marginally
significant and QTLUN is positive but not signifi-
cant is not consistent with our earlier interpretation
of QTL as a regulatory variable. Bank-UTHCs
would already be subject to the more stringent bank
holding company regulation, and thus penalties 
associated with the violation of the qualified-thrift-
lender test would have less impact on bank UTHCs
than nonbank ones.
Level of Risk
The second part of examining differences in 
performance is to look at the level of risk of the
institutions according to their organizational struc-
ture. A lack of market data and a relatively short
time series for the accounting data make a direct
examination of risk problematic. Consequently, we
pursue an alternative strategy of examining differ-
ences in a number of risk proxies constructed from
thrift balance sheet data. The approach is to devise
an empirical model that explains organizational type
using proxy variables for different risk characteristics
and business strategies constructed from thrift bal-
ance sheet and income statement data. Equations
(3) and (4) specify the model.
To control for thrift-level structural effects that
may be related to holding company affiliation, such
as scale of operation and geographic presence, we
include, regressors for business volume (SIZE) and
proportion of fixed-to-total assets (FIXEDA). (See
table 1 for a description of the variables.) Because
measures of capital adequacy and liquidity have been
shown to be related to the probability that a bank will
be closed, we include regressors for the ratio of capital
to assets (TIER1CAP) and regulatory liquidity
(REGLIQR). These are also included to capture 
regulatory restrictions on leverage and liquidity. 
OLS Re-estimation of Equation 2
Dependent Variable:  ROA
Coefficient t-Statistic Prob > t
Intercept 0.0010 0.67 0.5028
NIM 1.2667 34.60 <0.0001
NTCHRGOF –0.1240 –19.57 <0.0001
OVRHD –0.3590 –23.63 <0.0001
SIZE 0.0001 1.52 0.1298
LAGCAPA –0.0105 –6.36 <0.0001
FEESHR –0.0038 –5.74 <0.0001
LGAP –0.0036 –8.35 <0.0001
QTL –0.0014 –1.78 0.0755
INSDEPA –0.0004 –1.51 0.1301
DUMUN –0.0872 –19.69 <0.0001
NIMUN –0.2580 –3.08 0.0021
NTCHRGOFUN –1.1784 –8.08 <0.0001
OVRHDUN 0.5198 28.96 <0.0001
SIZEUN 0.0040 15.42 <0.0001
LAGCAPAUN 0.0105 3.62 0.0003
FEESHRUN 0.0347 17.40 <0.0001
LGAPUN 0.0097 5.76 <0.0001
QTLUN0 .0012 0.72 0.4729






Prob > F <.0001
Number of 
observations 7,132
SOURCES:  Office of Thrift Supervision, Thrift Financial Reports; and author’s calculations.
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To capture the diversification of loan portfolio and
funding sources, the Herfindahl indicies LNHERF
and LIABHERF are included. Higher levels of these
variables suggest higher levels of balance sheet risk.
Diversification of revenue streams is proxied for by
the proportion of interest income to total income
(INTSHR)—we assume that interest income and
noninterest income are not highly correlated. Higher
levels of INTSHR would suggest higher variability 
of revenues. Subordinated debt has been held up by
some as a potential source of market discipline for
depository institutions, so we included the propor-
tion of it to total assets (SUBDEBTA). The ratio of
Federal Home Loan Bank advances to total assets
(FHLBADVA) is included to proxy for funding 
strategy because this type of funding represents a 
subsidized alternative to deposits for funding assets,
albeit to the extent the thrift has sufficient eligible
collateral in the form of mortgage assets. Two regres-
sors are included to proxy for asset quality, the ratio 
of insider loans to total loans (INSLNA) and the 
ratio of classified assets to total earning assets 
(CLASSASM). Both loans to insiders as a percent 
of assets and measures of problem assets have been
shown to be positively related to bank closings. To
capture thrifts’ use of alternative business lines, we
include two proxies. The proportion of small business
loans to total assets (SBLA) represents thrifts’ new
small business and agricultural lending powers, and
the proportion of trust assets to total assets
(TRUSTA) represents fee-based activities. Finally,
because mortgage derivative securities represent
potential hedges against risks arising from mortgage
lending, the thrift’s proportion of these securities
(MDERA) is included, and because mortgage pool
securities represent an alternative to direct mortgage
holdings—an asset that is typically more liquid but
riskier than a traditional home mortgage loan—the
proportion of these (MPSA) is included as well. 
Equation (3) seeks to explain differences between
UTHC and non-UTHC thrifts, and (4) examines
differences between bank-UTHC and nonbank-
UTHC thrifts. Using the logistic regression proce-
dure in SAS, we estimate equations (3) and (4) over
the full sample and the UTHC sample, respectively.
The results appear in table 6. 
(3) DUMUTit =   0 +  1SIZEit +   2TIER1CAPit
+   3LNHERFit +   4LIABHERFit
+   5FIXEDAit +   6SBLAit
+   7INTSHRit +   8SUBDEBTAit
+   9FHLBADVAit +   10INSLNAit
+   11REGLIQRit +   12TRUSTAit
+    13MDERAit +    14MPSAit
+    15CLASSASMit +    it
(4) DUMUDit = 0 +    1SIZEit +   2TIER1CAPit
+    3LNHERFit +   4LIABHERFit
+    5FIXEDAit +   6SBLAit
+    7INTSHRit +   8SUBDEBTAit
+    9FHLBADVAit +  10INSLNAit
+    11REGLIQRit +   12TRUSTAit
+    13MDERAit +    14MPSAit
+    15CLASSASMit +    it
The results from equation 3 show important 
differences between UTHC thrifts and others in the
proxies for balance sheet structure and risk. Twelve
of the 15 regressors and the intercept term are sig-
nificant, a result that is not consistent with the
hypothesis that no differences in performance exist
between the two types of thrifts. UTHC thrifts are
significantly larger and hold significantly more tier 1
capital than thrifts in the non-UTHC sample. In
addition, the negative and significant coefficient on
LNHERF is consistent with UTHC thrifts having a
more diversified loan portfolio. None of these
results is consistent with the hypothesis that
UTHCs increase taxpayer risk. 
It is also interesting to note that the coefficient
on LIABHERF is negative and significant, which is
consistent with UTHC thrifts having more diversi-
fied funding sources. However, to the extent that
the lower-liability Herfindahl results from a higher
dependence on Federal Home Loan Bank advances
–—as indicated by the positive and significant 
coefficient on FHLBADVA—UTHC thrifts do not
necessarily rely less on funding sources subsidized by
implicit U.S. government guarantees.  
UTHC thrifts appear to have a higher ratio of
fixed assets to total assets, which may indicate that
they maintain larger branching networks (FIXEDA
is positive and significant). Given that thrifts have
more liberal branching powers than banks, both
before and after the Reigle-Neal Act of 1994, this
result is not surprising. Moreover, the positive and
significant coefficient on SBLA is also consistent
with this explanation. That is, it is commonly held
that an office presence in the community is needed
to make the relationship-based small business loan.
Therefore, we would expect thrifts with higher
investments in fixed assets, presumably branches, to
also have higher levels of small business loans. 
Thrifts in UTHCs have significantly lower ratios
of qualifying liquid assets12 to liabilities than non-
UTHC thrifts. In other words, the negative and 
significant coefficient on REGLIQR is consistent
with the higher levels of liquidity risk undertaken by
UTHCs. However, some caution should be used 
in interpreting this result. First, to the extent that



























■  12 Liquid assets for purposes of regulatory liquidity must conform to
the eligibility criteria as expressed in OTS Regulations 566.1(g).
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non-UTHC thrifts, UTHC thrifts would need a
secondary reserve less. Second, because holding
companies are a source of liquidity for their sub-
sidiary thrifts, we would also expect thrifts in 
holding companies to need liquid assets as a 
secondary reserve less.
The positive and significant sign on the propor-
tion of trust assets (TRUSTA) indicates that UTHC
thrifts are more active in services that generate fee
income. Note, proxies for other fee-related business
lines were omitted from this regression because of
the high degree of colinearity between these vari-
ables and TRUSTA—that is, thrifts that engaged in
one fee-based activity tend to be engaged in the oth-
ers. This result is consistent with FEESHR being
more important for UTHC thrifts as a determinant
of ROA in the equation (2) regression.  Moreover,
increased reliance on nonlending business is likely to
reduce the variability of revenues and the risk of loss
to depositors and deposit insurance funds. This
result does not support the hypothesis of no perfor-
mance-related differences.
Three other regression coefficients suggest that
UTHC thrifts may hold less risk than their non-
UTHC counterparts. First, UTHC thrifts hold more
mortgage derivative contracts (MDERA is positive
and significant). To the extent that these are used to
hedge risks, such as prepayment risks, from the mort-
gage portfolio, UTHC thrifts would hold less risk
than their less-hedged counterparts. Second, non-
UTHC thrifts have higher holdings of mortgage pool
securities than UTHC thrifts (MPSA is negative and
significant). Finally, UTHC thrifts appear less likely
to have risk exposure to insiders (INSLNA is negative
and significant). Thomson (1991, 1992) interprets
the ratio of inside loans to total loans as an indicator
of fraud and shows that INSLNA is related to the
probability of bank failure. Hence, the INSLNA
result could indicate potential problems in asset 
quality for non-UTHC thrifts.
Logit Regression Results
Equation 4:  Full Sample Equation 5:  UTHC Sample
Dependent Variable:  DUMUT Dependent Variable: DUMUD
Parameter Chi- Prob > Parameter Chi- Prob >
estimate Square Chi Square estimate Square Chi Square
Intercept –5.3877 218.4102 <0.0001 –0.3226 0.1428 0.7055
SIZE 0.6370 1457.7063 <0.0001 0.0327 0.5675 0.4513
TIER1CAP 10.0303 686.6470 <0.0001 –1.1386 2.1779 0.1400
LNHERF –0.0002 407.9386 <0.0001 –0.0001 36.1343 <0.0001
LIABHERF –0.0003 183.2916 <0.0001 0.0001 2.6080 0.1063
FIXEDA 7.7109 26.0477 <0.0001 7.7869 2.8527 0.0912
SBLA 1.1632 5.3536 0.0207 1.2726 0.6252 0.4291
INTSHR –0.0384 0.6350 0.4255 2.5124 40.8492 <0.0001
SUBDEBTA 7.7712 2.1190 0.1455 –19.6167 15.8421 <0.0001
FHLBADVA 1.7655 21.3132 <0.0001 1.7099 6.1526 0.0131
INSLNA –6.8246 5.3927 0.0202 46.0876 9.6365 0.0019
REGLIQR –0.0035 6.7873 0.0092 –0.0005 0.0223 0.8812
TRUSTA 0.1395 28.4154 <0.0001 –0.0134 0.5456 0.4601
MDERA 1.1045 19.5965 <0.0001 –0.3963 0.7169 0.3972
MPSA –0.7827 24.7668 <0.0001 2.3233 23.6342 <0.0001
CLASSASM –0.1634 0.1335 0.7149 –2.9886 11.5626 0.0007
“–2 LOG L” 21,931.422 3,777.77
AIC 21,963.422 3,753.194
Likelihood ratio 8,376.3025, DF:  15 84.5255, DF:  15
Prob > Chi Square <0.0001 <0.0001
Number of observations 25,655 7,122
SOURCES:  Office of Thrift Supervision, Thrift Financial Reports; and author’s calculations.
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Finally, it is important to note that the data
could not discriminate between UTHC and non-
UTHC thrifts in three areas: the share of revenues
represented by interest income (INTSHR), the
reliance on subordinated debt as a funding source
(SUBDEBTA), and the proportion of assets classi-
fied by regulators as problems (CLASSASM).
Overall, the results of the logit regression over
the full sample suggest that some important differ-
ences exist between UTHC thrifts and other thrifts.
However, none of the significant differences
between the two samples suggests that UTHC
thrifts engage in riskier activities or pose a greater
expected loss to the financial safety net than non-
UTHC thrifts. In fact, just the opposite appears to
be true. UTHC thrifts are more diversified in terms
of their lending portfolios and sources of revenue. 
In addition, UTHC thrifts are less leveraged and
appear to hedge more of their nondiversifiable risks
than do non-UTHC thrifts.
As noted above, the UTHC loophole would be
of most value to nonbank owners of UTHC thrifts.
Therefore, before we draw definitive conclusions,
we need to examine differences between UTHC
thrifts by ownership type. To do this, we estimate
equation (4) over the UTHC sample. Interestingly,
eight of the fifteen regression coefficients and the
intercept term are not significantly different from
zero—as opposed to three for equation (3). More-
over, all three of the insignificant regressors from
equation (3) are significant explanatory variables in
equation (4).
The regression results suggest that bank-UTHC
thrifts hold slightly more diversified loan portfolios
than nonbank-UTHC thrifts (LNHERF is negative
and significant). But bank-UTHC thrifts also hold
higher levels of mortgage pool securities (MPSA is
positive and significant), and this likely offsets
increased loan portfolio diversification and results in
a higher concentration of their mortgage-related
risks. In addition, nonbank-UTHC thrifts rely less
on interest income than bank-UTHC thrifts
(INTSHR is positive and significant). Overall, these
results suggest that the asset portfolios of nonbank-
UTHC thrifts are less exposed to mortgage-related
risks and that their revenue streams are more diversi-
fied than bank-UTHC thrifts. These results are not
inconsistent with the hypothesis that performance
differences trace to different real options held by
nonbank UTHCs.
Two important differences between our two sam-
ples of UTHC thrifts emerge from the funding side
of their balance sheets. First, bank-owned UTHCs
rely more heavily on subsidized Federal Home Loan
Bank advances (FHLBADVA is positive and signifi-
cant). Second, nonbank-UTHCs appear to be more
influenced by market-based forms of discipline than
bank-owned UTHCs (SUBDEBTA is negative and
significant). To the extent that subordinated debt
serves as a source of market discipline, the positive
and significant coefficient (albeit at the 90 percent
level) on SUBDEBTA is not consistent with the
hypothesis of no performance-related differences.13
However, it is possible that this variable is picking
up a preference by banks to issue subordinated debt
at the holding-company level instead of the level of
the thrift subsidiary. 
Finally, two conflicting effects are found for asset
quality. As noted before, previous research finds
INSLNA to be positively related to the probability of
failure. Hence, the positive and significant coefficient
on INSLNA for bank-UTHC thrifts indicates they
have potential asset quality problems. On the other
hand, the negative and significant coefficient on
CLASSASM suggests nonbank-UTHC thrifts have
higher levels of substandard assets on their books. 
In general, the results from equations (3) and (4)
do not appear to be consistent with the hypothesis
that the UTHC loophole increases the risk to tax-
payers by extending the safety-net subsidy to nonde-
pository firms. We find no evidence from balance-
sheet proxies that the asset and liability decisions of
UTHC thrifts, particularly nonbank-UTHC thrifts,
pose higher risks. In fact, we tend to see that non-
bank-UTHC thrifts rely less on mortgage-related
assets and more on nonsubsidized sources of funds
than their counterparts.
IV.  Policy Conclusions
Debates over the merits of commingling banking 
and commerce have focused on the potential effi-
ciency gains associated with enhanced bundles of 
real options afforded by cross-industry mergers. 
These efficiency gains are weighed against potential
efficiency losses due to possible conflicts of interest,
extension of the financial safety net (and the atten-
dant moral hazard incentives) to nonfinancial activi-
ties, and increased concentration of economic power.
The UTHC exemption represents the commin-
gling of banking and commerce in the United
States. The degree of commingling is limited
because the commercial lending powers of thrift
institutions are restricted and because nonbanks
must satisfy the qualified-thrift-lender requirement
to own UTHCs. The Financial Services Moderniza-
tion Act of 1999 effectively eliminated this exemp-
tion, preventing the formation of additional non-
bank-owned UTHCs. 
This paper examines the merits of the UTHC
exemption as a limited form of commingled banking
and commerce. It tests for differences in performance
of non-UTHC thrifts and two categories of UTHC
thrifts. While performance differences are found,
■  13 See Federal Reserve System (1999).
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none suggests nonbank ownership of thrift holding
companies poses a risk to the federal financial safety
net, at least no greater a risk than a bank-owned
UTHC or an independent thrift poses. Furthermore,
we find evidence of performance differences that 
suggest nonbank-UTHC thrifts hold a different set 
of real options than unaffiliated thrifts and hence
have the potential for gains in economic efficiency.
Therefore, our results do not provide an economic
justification for the Financial Services Modernization
Act’s elimination of the UTHC exemption. Given the
limited scope of powers afforded to nonbank owners
of UTHCs, these results do not extend to proposals
for more general forms of universal banking. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
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Introduction
Questions about the persistence of economic shocks
currently occupy an important place in economics.
Much of the recent controversy has centered on “unit
roots,” determining whether aggregate time series are
better approximated by fluctuations around a deter-
ministic trend or by a random walk plus a stationary
component. The mixed empirical results reflect the
general difficulties in measuring low-frequency 
components. Persistence, however, has richer and
more relevant facets than the asymptotic behavior at
the heart of the unit root debate. In particular, frac-
tionally differenced stochastic processes parsimo-
niously capture an important type of long-range
dependence midway between the quick decay of an
ARMA process and the infinite persistence of a 
random walk. Fractional differencing allows some-
thing of a return to the classical NBER business cycle
program exemplified by Wesley Claire Mitchell, who
urged examinations of stylized facts at all frequencies. 
Though useful in areas such as international
finance (Diebold, Husted, and Rush [1991] and 
Baillie, Bollerslev, and Mikkelsen [1993]), fractionally
differenced processes have had less success in macro-
economics. For GDP at least, it is hard to estimate the
appropriate fractional parameter with any precision.
One promising technique (Geweke and Porter-Hudak
[1983] and Diebold and Rudebusch [1989]) also has
serious small-sample bias, which limits its usefulness
(Agiakloglou, Newbold, and Wohar [1993]).
Although both Deibold and Rudebusch (1989) and
Sowell (1992) find point estimates that suggest long-
term dependence, they cannot reject either extreme of
finite-order ARMA or a random walk. The estimation
problems raise again the question posed by Christiano
and Eichenbaum (1990) about unit roots: do we
know and do we care? In this paper we provide an
affirmative answer to both questions. 
Do we know? Applying the modified rescaled
range (R/S) statistic confronts the data with a test
at once both more precise and more robust than
previous estimation techniques. The R/S statistic
has shown its versatility and usefulness in a variety
of different contexts (Lo [1991] and Haubrich
[1993]). Operationally, we can determine what we
know about our tests for long-range dependence by
using Monte Carlo simulations of their size and
power. Not surprisingly, with typical macroeco-
nomic sample sizes we cannot distinguish between
fractional exponents of 1.000 and 0.999, but we
can distinguish between exponents of 0 and 0.333. 
Do we care? Persistence matters directly for mak-
ing predictions and forecasts. It matters in a more
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